As part of its enforcement duties under the National Health Service (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) (No. 2) Regulations 2013, and in exercise of the powers assigned to it by the Health and Social Care Act 2012, the health care sector regulator for England (Monitor) is cocompetent with the competition watchdog (Competition and Markets Authority) to enforce competition law in health care markets. Oddly, though, unlike other sector regulators, Monitor does not have a duty to promote competition but 'simply' to prevent anti-competitive behaviour. Monitor is also competent to carry out reviews and to decide bid disputes concerning procurement carried out by health care bodies, provided there is no formal challenge under the Public Contracts Regulations 2006. This paper contends that such a concentration of regulatory, competition enforcement and procurement review powers puts Monitor in a unique situation of (potential) structural conflict of interest that can diminish significantly its ability to act as an effective (co-competent) competition authority. This paper focusses on this difficult structure for the enforcement of competition law in the health care sector in England, in particular due to the asymmetrical, sui generis concurrency regime created by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 and the Concurrency Regulations 2014. As examples of such conflict of interest and its implications, the paper assesses Monitor's incentives to bend the interpretation of both art.101(3) TFEU and the new special regime on procurement of social services (arts.72-77 dir 2014/24). The paper concludes that this situation requires regulatory reform to devolve powers to the Competition and Markets Authority. This paper contends that such a concentration of regulatory, competition enforcement and procurement review powers puts Monitor in a unique situation of (potential) structural conflict of interest that can diminish significantly its ability to act as an effective (co-competent) competition authority. This paper focusses on this difficult structure for the enforcement of competition law in the health care sector in England, in particular due to the asymmetrical, sui generis concurrency regime created by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 and the Concurrency Regulations 2014. As examples of such conflict of interest and its implications, the paper assesses Monitor's incentives to bend the interpretation of both art.101(3) TFEU and the new special regime on procurement of social services (arts.72-77 dir 2014/24). The paper concludes that this situation requires regulatory reform to devolve powers to the Competition and Markets Authority.
Introduction
One of the relatively recent novelties in the regulation of competition in the English health care sector revolves around the creation of Monitor by the Health and Social Care Act 2012. 2 Monitor is a
After an important consultation exercise to 'pause, listen and reflect' on the content of the Health and Social Care Bill, and taking into account those worries about a significant structural change leading to the privatisation of the NHS England by means of increased competition, the NHS Future Forum stressed that 'competition should be used to secure greater choice and better value for patients -it should be used not as an end in itself, but to improve quality, promote integration and increase citizens' rights ' . 8 This overarching shift in focus was reflected in the NHS Future Forum's recommendation to 'remove Monitor's primary duty 'to promote competition' and be clear that their primary duty should be to protect and promote the interests of the patient'. 9 However, the Forum was still convinced of the value of entrusting Monitor with competition enforcement powers, given that ' [t] here needs to be an effective regulator that tackles abuses that are not in the interest of patients or the taxpayer'. 10 It supported a specific proposal to keep the concurrent powers for
Monitor on the basis that competition enforcement 'would be best done by a dedicated regulator with a greater knowledge of the unique nature of healthcare, including the importance of cooperation through clinical networks and the benefits of integrating services to improve quality'.
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The concurrency system was consequently finally kept in the Health and Social Care Act 2012, and it has developed in a sui generis way on the basis of these contradictory tendencies to, on the one hand, try to restrict promotion of competition 'for its own sake but use it as a tool to improve quality' (sic) and, on the other, entrusting Monitor with 'standard' competition enforcement powers in this sector on equal footing with the CMA ( §3).
With that background in mind, for the purposes of this paper, it is worth stressing the simultaneous empowerment of Monitor regarding: 1) the enforcement of both UK and EU competition law in the provision of health care services in England, as a co-competent authority with the 'general' competition watchdog, the now Competition and Markets Authority (CMA);
12 2) the regulation of the health care sector in England, particularly in terms of licensing of providers and that the Government, not the law courts of this country, determine NHS policy' (cols 184-185, emphasis added). The conflation between legal and policy elements seems evident and the assumption that the Government could design the enforcement of competition law in the health care sector in a way that actually excluded it from the application of (EU) competition rules is pervasive. determination of prices and public tariffs payable by commissioners for NHS services; 13 and 3) the review of public procurement carried out in the health care sector. 14 Consequently, Monitor is simultaneously the sector regulator, a co-competent competition authority and a (main) procurement review body in the health care sector in England. This creates an enforcement structure that ultimately results in a structural conflict of interest for Monitor, which may be called upon to carry out ex post competition or procurement reviews of situations created, or at least facilitated, by its ex ante regulatory decisions (in terms of licensing, promotion of integration and cooperative provision, or pricing/tariff determination). For instance, Monitor may receive complaints of anticompetitive behaviour that ultimately result from previous licensing decisions (if they create a market setting that enables collusion), or of procurement actions that are ultimately based in its previous decisions to authorise certain forms of collaborative/integrated provision of services. This conflict of interest is structural and hence unavoidable for Monitor (as discussed below, §2.2).
This situation is clearly peculiar and different from those in most other EU jurisdictions, including those with a health care sector regulator such as the Netherlands, 15 where the accumulation of powers is more restricted (at least, as procurement is concerned In criticising the peculiar statutory approach to Monitor's competition duties and powers, this paper contends that such a concentration of regulatory, competition enforcement and procurement review powers puts Monitor in a unique situation of (potential) structural conflict of interest that can diminish significantly its ability to act as an effective (co-competent) competition authority ( §2). It also argues that the absence of general concurrency checks and balances prevents the CMA from compensating for that faulty institutional design ( §3). More specifically, as an example of such conflict of interest and its implications, the paper assesses Monitor's incentives to bend the interpretation of both art.101(3) TFEU ( §4) and the new special regime on procurement of social services (arts.18(1) and 72-77 dir 2014/24) ( §5). Some critical remarks follow and the paper concludes that regulatory reform to 'devolve' powers to the CMA is necessary ( §6).
2. Monitor's structural conflict of interest and its role as co-competent competition authority
A structural conflict between regulators and competition authorities in the EU?
As a background for the assessment of Monitor's position as a co-competent competition authority ( §2.2) and the asymmetrical, sui generis concurrency regime that regulates its relationship with the CMA for the enforcement of EU and UK competition rules ( §3), it is worth stressing some basic points concerning the interaction between EU competition law and sector regulation generally. 17 The general approach to the interaction (or overlap) between competition and sector regulation in EU law can best be seen in the difficulties for the enforcement of art.102 TFEU in regulated industries.
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In a simplified and streamlined fashion, it can be understood that sector regulation and competition need to be applied as two overlapping layers of economic regulation. Hence, ex ante regulatory interventions are insufficient to alter the ex post competition analysis of (unilateral, discretionary or 'free') behaviour that can restrict or distort competition. '. 20 In that regard, the 'EU model' of 'supplementary or phased application' of competition law and sector regulation diverges from the approach in other jurisdictions and, notably, from the (emerging) 'US model' of 'alternative or single application', where sector regulation/intervention aimed at promoting competition in the regulated market pre-empts (separate) competition law enforcement. 21 The discussion of which model is superior exceeds the possibilities of this paper. Overall, the conflict of interests or duties that pervades the activities of the sector regulator is bound to contaminate any competition intervention it carries out. Consequently, as a point of departure, the EU model of 'supplementary or phased application' of competition law and sector regulation does not fit well with the accumulation of regulatory and competition enforcement powers in a single authority such as Monitor. If the regulatory and competition regimes are supplementary, and in order to avoid implicit 'deformations' of competition enforcement requirements, the regulator should not be granted competition enforcement powers and, reversely, the competition watchdog should refrain from regulating market activities. That being said, such accumulation of powers has driven recent reforms in the competition enforcement institutional design in certain EU Member States (such as Spain), 26 
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In that regard, a cursory look at the powers and duties of Monitor could seem to indicate a superiority or priority of competition concerns in the discharge of all of its duties (and, remarkably, its regulatory and procurement oversight powers). However, that is not necessarily the case (for the reasons outlined above §1). Indeed, Monitor has competing duties concerning the objectives of: decisions that required integrated provision of certain sorts of services and, consequently, allowed for the exclusion of specialist competitors that then complained that the integrated suppliers (jointly) abused their market position or coordinated their behaviour in the provision of the services in an anti-competitive way, or that such decision on integrated provision for the purposes of NHS services had a restrictive competition effect in the neighbouring market for private provision. regulating its relationship with the CMA fail to provide for the proper enforcement of (EU) competition law if Monitor prioritises regulatory activity over competition enforcement duties ( §3).
For the purposes of this paper, and in view of the potential conflicts derived from conflicting duties, it is relevant to stress that Monitor is obliged to dismiss any of its duties as a sector regulator when it enforces competition provisions, 44 except if they relate to issues that the CMA could take into account if it was the acting competition authority. 45 46 Even if these additional indications as to the prioritisation of competition duties seem to clearly try to address the difficulties derived from Monitor's accumulation of powers, it is hard to see how they can properly tackle the problem. Particularly because Monitor's over-arching general duty is to protect and promote the interests of people who use health care services by promoting provision of health care services which is economic, efficient and effective, and maintains or improves the quality of the services, 47 which it can read as implying that "patients' interest" trumps competition considerations. 48 And, in any case, because Monitor is likely to be exercising its regulatory (and other) powers in a continuous manner, which makes it difficult to accept that it will be able to adopt decisions in the vacuum (eg, deciding that certain behaviour is anti-competitive despite the fact that it had adopted previous or related regulatory decisions that did not prevent it). Moreover, it is hard to ask an institution that is trying to regulate a market to have the sufficient objectivity to assess the effects of its regulatory activities and, where warranted, to enforce competition rules on economic agents which market decisions it is entrusted with overseeing.
Generally, these difficulties have been in the background of the relatively poor enforcement of competition rules by (other) co-competent sector regulators in the UK 49 and, ultimately, led to the creation of a revised concurrency regime in 2013. However, that system does not (fully) apply to Monitor-which benefits from an asymmetrical, sui generis status ( §3)-and the problems derived from this (structural) conflict of interest or statutory duties remains unsolved 50 (below §6).
The asymmetrical, sui generis concurrency regime for Monitor
As briefly mentioned, one of the peculiarities of the UK system for the enforcement of EU and UK competition law is the concurrency of the CMA as competition watchdog and sector regulators.
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Generally speaking, the system relies on a number of checks and balances created by the Enterprise 
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This is highly counterintuitive and sets up an asymmetrical, sui generis concurrency regime that seems difficult to reconcile with the fact that co-competent authorities are fundamentally on equal footing and, if anything, the CMA must play a prominent role. 66 However, that is clearly not the case when Monitor is concerned. Consequently, the effectiveness of competition policy in health care markets can be jeopardised if Monitor does not uphold high standards of competition enforcement motu proprio. Within this system, the CMA will also struggle to 'engage in a broad strategic dialogue with [Monitor] and look for opportunities to promote effective competition' as generally required by the 'strategic steer' issued by the UK Government to the CMA in October 2013. 68 Following from this point of departure regarding the asymmetric concurrency with Monitor, the CMA faces further limitations in the management of its concurrency with Monitor, as the CMA: 1) cannot determine that it rather than Monitor should exercise competition enforcement functions in relation to a new case; 69 and 2) cannot take over a case previously (self)allocated to Monitor, even if it is satisfied that doing so would further the promotion of competition for the benefit of consumers, unless the case is not principally concerned with matters relating to the provision of health care services for the purposes of the NHS in England. 70 Moreover, Monitor is not affected by the power of the Secretary of State to remove the competition functions from a sector regulator if it considers that it is appropriate to do so for the purpose of promoting competition, within any market or markets in the UK, for the benefit of consumers. 71 Finally, Monitor is not a member of the United Kingdom Competition Network (UKCN), but solely has observer status. 72 Generally, then, the asymmetrical, sui generis concurrency regime designed for Monitor does not comprise any of the fundamental safeguards that would allow the CMA or, in extreme circumstances the Secretary of State, to correct deviations in the way in which Monitor applies UK and EU competition law. Additionally, its participation in the UKCN can be much more limited and passive than that of other sector regulators. Overall, this is fundamentally a suppression of the only significant checks and balances generally existing under the concurrency regime applicable to the other sector regulators in the UK and leaves Monitor free to keep competition enforcement cases away from the CMA. To be sure, Monitor's decisions can be appealed to the Competition Appeals Tribunal by the affected undertakings. 73 However, this seems insufficient to guarantee a proper functioning of the system. 74 Thus, from an institutional design perspective, this is problematic. It particularly creates difficulties when EU competition law must be enforced by Monitor-which, given the structural conflict of interest that affects Monitor and the lack of checks by the CMA,can fail to meet the requirements derived from Regulation 1/2003. 75 Moreover, this is bound to create problems in the proper enforcement of EU public procurement rules-particularly, in view of the pro-competitive requirements included in art.18(1) of Directive 2014/24. 76 The remainder of the paper looks into these two issues in more detail, as examples of the need for a regulatory reform that avoids potential clashes with and infringements of EU law derived from the (structural) conflict of interest or conflict of duties that affects Monitor and that its asymmetric, sui generis concurrency regime fails to mitigate (below §6).
Monitor's incentives to bend art.101(3) TFEU
One of the areas in which Monitor can have a conflict of interest in the interpretation and enforcement of EU competition law relates to the exemption of otherwise prohibited agreements on the basis that, despite being anti-competitive, they further "patients' interests". The conflict would derive from Monitor's conflation of its duties in a way that tries to avoid sanctioning ex post anticompetitive practices that it generally (or ex ante) views as supporting goals such as enabling health care services to be provided in an integrated way, or to be integrated with the provision of healthrelated services or social care services (above §2.2). This risk would materialize if Monitor decided that whatever is considered in the "interest of patients" or NHS users could trump pro-competitive requirements and allow for distortions of competition. That would create a risk of incompatibility with the interpretation and enforcement of EU competition law-and, ultimately, it would risk infringing the UK's obligations under Regulation 1/2003. Such incompatibility could only be avoided if "patients' interest" could be reconciled with "consumer-benefitting (qualitative) efficiencies" under the exception provided for by art.101(3) TFEU. In simpler terms, then, the temptation is there for Monitor to adopt an excessively broad interpretation of art.101(3) TFEU and to exempt restrictive practices on the basis of the quality improvement they create in cases where any other competition authority (and notably, the CMA or the European Commission) would not.
Interestingly, Monitor has published guidance on how it plans to interpret the requirements of "patients' interest" and when this consideration can trump pro-competitive requirements. 77 It must be stressed that the guidance has not been issued in relation to the exercise of its competition powers, but rather of its public procurement oversight powers. Nonetheless, the substantive elements of the guidance should remain valid throughout. Generally, the balancing test proposed by Monitor can be described in the following terms: This is presented as a clearly qualitative approach to the balancing of competing interests and Monitor seems to have clearly departed from the apparently more precise and economic (ie financially-oriented) cost/benefit analysis that it had proposed in the draft substantive guidance published in May 2013. 79 In the earlier draft guidance, Monitor aimed at 'costing' the distortions of competition and 'pricing' the benefits created by the less than fully competitive procurement scenarios. 80 Under the revised and more qualitative guidance, the negative impacts on competition will be assessed according to a rather standard competition appraisal. Such analysis will be concerned with i) the nature of the restriction on competition, ii) the number of providers of a particular health care service that are affected by the commissioner's conduct and their importance as suppliers of that service, iii) the extent to which those providers affected by the conduct are close alternatives, and iv) the expected duration of the conduct or its effects. In this regard, the screening that Monitor intends to carry out to identify the negative effects of anti-competitive NHS commissioning broadly follows the accepted analytical methods of most non-sectoral competition authorities. 81 Hence, it should be expected that the negative effects identified under this methodology are mainly of an economic nature and primarily concerned with static and dynamic reduction of competition and, eventually, with an overall restriction of choice in case of exit of some of the suppliers from the given market.
However, the assessment of the benefits that may compensate for such negative implications of a restriction of competition in NHS procurement and commissioning creates some analytical difficulties. Those derive from the fact that Monitor will not exclusively focus on economic efficiencies, or even on efficiencies that can easily be translated into economic terms. As clearly spelled out 
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Monitor will then assess those benefits taking into consideration their materiality, such as the relevance of the qualitative improvements and the number of patients that can benefit from them, their lead time (ie period necessary to achieve them) and duration, and the robustness of the analysis and evidence that supports them. It will also consider whether the restrictions on competition are actually necessary to achieve the benefits. More specifically, 'Monitor will consider the extent to which achieving the benefits more quickly or cost-effectively outweighs the cost resulting from the reduction in competition as part of its cost/benefit analysis'.
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This analytical framework creates uncertainty, as it revolves around qualitative elements that differ from the standard 'efficiency analysis' that competition authorities usually consider in their enforcement of competition rules and focuses on parameters that are difficult to define and to measure in an objective manner (as further discussed below). 84 It may also be sometimes difficult to justify the acceptability of a costly restriction of competition where the expected benefits may be diffuse or not rank very highly in terms of the priorities for the improvement in the provision of health care services. That will require Monitor to engage in regulatory and policy-led decisionmaking, which may lead to conflicts with its own competition law enforcement duties (above §2.2).
In the end, the methodology for the cost/benefit analysis (in both clinical and non-clinical dimensions) results in the consideration that
This is not a mathematical exercise, but a qualitative assessment. Relevant benefits might outweigh the restriction on competition when, for example … there is a reduction of competition between a small number of providers, but a significant number of other providers of the relevant services remain and the clinical benefits of the initiative are significant and well evidenced.
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It is then necessary to clarify to what extent Monitor can take into consideration 'qualitative efficiencies' (ie non-economic or medical/clinical aspects of the concept of "patients' interest") within the framework provided by the relevant EU competition rules. Before that, it is important to acknowledge that a potential conflict of substantive assessments will only arise where EU competition law is applicable, 86 which triggers the question of whether a cross-border competition effect needs to exist for EU law to be relevant. However, given the relatively unclear state of the law harmonisation of substantive assessment would increase legal certainty, since undertakings would know that they are bound to be subjected to the same rules regardless of any eventual final finding on the existence (or not) of a cross-border distortion of competition.
In that regard, it is important to stress that under paragraphs 69 to 72 of the Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) , 89 the European Commission has indicated that the 'qualitative efficiencies' it is willing to take into account as a justification for an otherwise anti-competitive agreement are primarily concerned with research and development efforts leading to: i) the offer of new or improved goods and services, or ii) products and services of higher quality or with novel features, or iii) services that are better tailored to customer needs or iv) to provide quicker delivery or better quality assurance. In that regard, it seems possible to reconcile "patients' interest" understood as significant qualitative clinical and non-clinical advantages with the type of qualitative efficiency that the European Commission would in principle be willing to take into account.
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When it comes to the assessment of the degree to which those efficiencies are passed on to the final users, it is also relevant to take into account that the Therefore, in order to avoid breaching EU competition law, Monitor should keep a demanding approach towards the assessment of non-competitive dimension of "patients' interest". In that regard, and to ensure that Monitor sticks to its disclosed guidance and to the generally accepted enforcement practices, it would be highly desirable to reinstate the CMA's general concurrency powers, so that it can act and intervene should Monitor deviate from the expected interpretation and enforcement approach (below §6). A similarly strict approach will be required under EU public procurement law, as the following section shows.
Monitor's incentives to bend arts.18(1) and 72-77 of Directive 2014/24
The second area where Monitor can have an incentive to deviate from pro-competitive enforcement activity concerns public procurement review and, in particular, those cases where the complainants' main concern identifies a (net) negative impact on competition in the market. As mentioned in passing, reg.10 of the NHS (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) (No. 2) Regulations 2013 allows for anti-competitive behaviour in the commissioning or procurement of services for the purposes of the NHS if doing so is in the interests of people who use health care services. This allows Monitor to refrain from investigating and sanctioning that behaviour in the exercise of its procurement review powers. This possibility is clearly at odds with its competition enforcement powers, unless a very strict approach to the assessment of "patients' interest" is carried out to ensure that there is actually no deviation in the interpretation and enforcement of art.101(3) TFEU in order to determine whether there is (net, inefficient or non-exemptible) anti-competitive behaviour (above §4). In such a case, though, it can be argued that reg. 95 'This is not a mathematical exercise, but a qualitative assessment'. 96 The differences can be derived from Monitor's already discussed potential bias towards a lenient or soft approach, which should be countervailed by its obligations not to take into account regulatory powers and discretion when enforcing competition rules (above §3 99 Hence, it could be argued that this discussion is superfluous. However, given that Monitor accumulates the third layer of procurement oversight to the previously discussed powers of regulation and competition enforcement, it is worth assessing its potential conflicts of interest or duties in the interpretation and enforcement of the new 2014 EU public procurement rules. 100 Setting competition law consideration aside for now, the concept of "patient's interest" as potentially encompassing less than competitive procurement practices raises a prima facie case of incompatibility with EU public procurement law and, more specifically, with the goal and principle of competition thereby embedded. As formulated in art.18 of Directive 2014/24, it is a general principle of EU procurement law that it has to run in a way that avoids distortions or restrictions of competition; and, more precisely, ' Overall, there seems to be nothing in art.76 that deactivates the requirement in art.18 that procurement for social services, including health care, shall be conducted without the intention of artificially narrowing competition. Or, in more natural terms, that such procurement is conducted in at least a competition-neutral manner. It also seems to be lacking any specific rule that would deactivate the presumption that competition shall be considered to have been artificially narrowed where the design of the procurement is made with the intention of unduly favouring or disadvantaging certain economic operators. The fact that art.76(1) only expressly mentions the principles of transparency and equal treatment (so that, a contrario, there could be a deviation from the requirement for competition) seems unsatisfactory as a reason to exclude pro-competitive requirements. Consequently, the proposed interpretation of the specific criteria listed in art.76(2) of the new Directive is that they still need to be identified and implemented in a manner that falls short from introducing unjustified restrictions or distortions of competition.
If that general approach is correct, then, even if it could be understood that the standard of "patients' interest" in reg.10 of the NHS (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) (No. 2) Regulations 2013 is the domestic equivalent of the "quality-related" elements in art.76(2) of Directive 2014/24, 104 the authorisation of anti-competitive procurement still seems to fall outside the increased scope for flexibility created in Directive 2014/24 for the procurement of social services. This is so, at least, as a matter of a general authorisation to completely exclude competition in the tendering of those contracts-and, concomitantly, to allow for anti-competitive practices in the procurement of services for the NHS. Consequently, even taking into account all the flexibility and leeway created in the special regime for the award of social and other specific services of the new Directive, EU public procurement rules are at odds with a general authorisation for "anticompetitive procurement in the patients' interest" that could be read in reg.10 of the NHS (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) (No. 2) Regulations 2013 . Such an incompatibility is rightly created by the Directive because, even in cases where there are particular patients' needs, competition between all providers potentially able to satisfy them is the only way of ensuring that, ultimately, there is an actual delivery of the services or goods necessary to satisfy that need to the highest possible quality level. In other words, NHS commissioners can specify as demanding requirements as they consider appropriate and proportionate to satisfy the perceived patients' needs-but, once they have done so, they must refrain from engaging in any artificial restriction of the competition for the award for the contract. Consequently, from the procurement perspective, Therefore, the potential conflict between patients' interests and badly-designed competition for the provision of services should not be sorted out by excluding competition. The reconciliation of these competing goals should rather derive from improved procurement techniques that are better suited to the proper identification of the patients' needs and their translation into technical specifications and contractual requirements, or contract compliance clauses. To be sure, the distinction between necessary and unnecessary procurement requirements will be difficult and may entail certain value judgments, but this is in line with the 'competition-dimension' of the enforcement of reg.10 and, consequently, should be subjected to equally demanding standards of evidence. 6. Conclusion: a (devolution) of powers to the CMA as a superior option
